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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the design of a pilot
spoofing attack (PSA) carried out by multiple single-antenna
eavesdroppers (Eves) in a downlink time-division duplex (TDD)
system, where a multiple antenna base station (BS) transmits
confidential information to a single-antenna legitimate user
(LU). During the uplink channel training phase, multiple Eves
collaboratively impair the channel acquisition of the legitimate
link, aiming at maximizing the wiretapping signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) in the subsequent downlink data transmission phase. Two
different scenarios are investigated: (1) the BS is unaware of the
PSA, and (2) the BS attempts to detect the presence of the PSA.
For both scenarios, we formulate wiretapping SNR maximization
problems. For the second scenario, we also investigate the prob-
ability of successful detection and constrain it to remain below a
pre-designed threshold. The two resulting optimization problems
can be unified into a more general non-convex optimization
problem, and we propose an efficient algorithm based on the
minorization-maximization (MM) method and the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to solve it. The proposed
MM-ADMM algorithm is shown to converge to a stationary
point of the general problem. In addition, we propose a semi-
definite relaxation (SDR) method as a benchmark to evaluate
the efficiency of the MM-ADMM algorithm. Numerical results
show that the MM-ADMM algorithm achieves near-optimal
performance and is computationally more efficient than the SDR-
based method.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, pilot spoofing attack,
detection probability, non-convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) techniques have attracted
significant attention as a viable option for securing wireless
communications [1]–[3]. Recently, due to the spatial degrees of
freedom offered by multiple antennas, multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) techniques have been exploited to further
enhance PLS [4]–[6]. In particular, secure beamforming and
artificial-noise-aided transmission are two well-known ap-
proaches to facilitate PLS that have been considered in the
context of point-to-point multiple antenna systems [7]–[11],
multi-user multiple antenna systems [12]–[14], and multiple
relay systems [15]–[17]. To enhance the secrecy capacity/rate
in PLS, knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of
the legitimate receiver at the transmitter is crucial. In practice,
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the CSI has to be obtained by transmitting a training sequence
during a training phase. However, in most of the existing
literature on PLS, the training phase has been ignored and
the CSI at the transmitter is modelled as perfect [8], [9] or
imperfect [18], [19]. A few works on PLS consider both the
training and data transmission procedure, but are only focused
on passive Eves, i.e., the Eves keep silent during both channel
training and data transmission [11], [20]–[22].
Recently, it has been shown in [23] that an intelligent active
eavesdropper can greatly enhance its wiretapping capability by
implementing a pilot spoofing attack (PSA). More specifically,
in a time division duplex (TDD) system with a multiple-
antenna base station (BS) and a single-antenna user, the down-
link time slot is usually divided into two phases. The first phase
is used for uplink training where the legitimate user (LU)
transmits a pilot sequence to the BS for channel estimation. In
the second phase, i.e., the downlink data transmission phase,
the estimated uplink channel is regarded as the downlink
channel by exploiting reciprocity, and beamforming based on
this CSI is used to transmit the confidential message to the
LU. However, if an eavesdropper (Eve) attacks the uplink
training phase by transmitting the same pre-designed training
sequence as the LU, the estimated channel obtained at the BS
is a weighted combination of the legitimate channel and the
wiretap channel. Based on this incorrect CSI, the beam formed
by the BS will be oriented towards both the LU and the Eve,
which results in severe signal leakage to Eve.
A number of works focused on combating the PSA [24]–
[30]. In [24], to detect the PSA, the authors proposed a random
training scheme, wherein the training signal is randomly
chosen from a set of phase-shift keying symbols. The PSA
detection probability of this scheme can approach 1 arbitrarily
close if the number of antennas at the BS is sufficiently large.
However, the training sequence has to be transmitted twice,
which decreases spectrum efficiency. In [25], [26], the authors
formulated the PSA detection as a binary hypothesis testing
problem, and the likelihood ratio based on the energy of the
received signal was used as the detection statistic. In [27],
the authors proposed a two-way training scheme to detect
the PSA. If the PSA is detected successfully, the BS will
simultaneously estimate the channels of the LU and Eve, and
the estimates are used to safeguard transmission via secure
beamforming. In [28], the authors studied the PSA for a
multiple cell multiple user massive MIMO system. To facilitate
secure transmission, matched filter precoding combined with
artificial noise generation is adopted at the BS, and the optimal
power allocation policy for the signal and the artificial noise
is derived. In [29], [30], the authors investigated the secure
degrees of freedom (DoF) in multiple user massive MIMO
2systems in the presence of a full-duplex Eve who is capable
of eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. The authors
proposed a scheme that hides the pilot signal assignments
from Eve by utilizing an extended pilot signal set. As a
consequence, the obtained secure DoF are equal to the secure
DoF when Eve does not attack.
Although the above works make important steps towards
overcoming the PSA, they assume that there is only one Eve
whose transmit power is fixed regardless of the CSI. However,
in practice, there may be multiple cooperating Eves employing
more intelligent methods to perform the PSA. This is the main
motivation for this paper. In this paper, we take the point
of view of the Eves, and investigate how multiple Eves can
cooperatively design the PSA to achieve better wiretapping
performance. We assume that the Eves know their own CSI,
which allows them to adjust and optimize their attacking
signals accordingly. The consideration of multiple Eves allows
us to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the potential
secrecy threats in wireless communication systems. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We establish a new PSA model for TDD systems wherein
multiple collusive Eves collaborate to improve their wire-
tapping capability. Based on this model, we assume that
the Eves perform the PSA collaboratively during the
uplink channel training phase in order to improve the
receiving signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of a target Eve
during the subsequent downlink data transmission phase.
We consider two different scenarios, i.e., (a) the BS is
unaware of the PSA and thus directly transmits the data
after estimating the legitimate channel, and (b) the BS
carries out a detection operation after each uplink channel
training phase to determine whether a PSA has occurred.
For both scenarios, wiretapping SNR maximization prob-
lems are formulated.
2) For the second scenario, we first investigate the successful
detection probability, i.e., the probability that the PSA
is successfully detected by the BS. In particular, the
successful detection probability is derived under two
assumptions regarding the BS’s prior knowledge of the
Eves’ channel. In order to conceal the PSA from the BS,
we assume the Eves try to keep the successful detection
probability below an acceptable threshold. This leads to
a corresponding constraint in the wiretapping SNR maxi-
mization problem. Thereby, from the Eves’ point of view,
the successful detection probability specifies the risk of
being discovered. Therefore, the formulated optimization
problem allows the Eves to adjust the trade-off between
improving their wiretapping SNR and reducing the risk
of being detected.
3) The two formulated maximization problems are unified
into one general non-convex optimization problem, and
we develop an efficient algorithm to solve it. To this
end, we first transform the non-convex problem into a
series of convex problems by invoking the minorization-
maximization (MM) principle [31], [32]. Subsequently,
the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)
[33]–[36] is used to decompose the obtained convex prob-
lems into several sub-problems that either have a closed-
form solution or can be efficiently solved by Newton’s
method. The resulting MM-ADMM algorithm is shown to
converge to a stationary point of the original optimization
problem. We also provide an alternative method based
on semidefinite relaxation (SDR) to solve a special case
of the considered general non-convex problem, along
with a sufficient condition for when this method achieves
the global optimum. Numerical results show that the
proposed MM-ADMM algorithm achieves near-optimal
performance but requires a much lower computational
complexity than the widely used SDR-based method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we present the system model with multiple Eves carrying
out the PSA. In Section III, for the case where the BS is
unaware of the PSA, we formulate an optimization problem
for maximizing the SNR of a target Eve. In Section IV, for
the case where the BS attempts to detect the presence of
the PSA, we derive the successful detection probability and
formulate an optimization problem for maximizing the SNR
of the target Eve while keeping the probability of successful
detection under a pre-defined threshold. In Section V, we
develop the proposed MM-ADMM algorithm to solve the
optimization problems established in Section III and IV. In
Section VI, we present numerical results. Finally, in Section
VII, we conclude the paper.
Notation: (·)T , (·)∗, (·)H , (·)−1, and Tr (·) represent trans-
pose, conjugate, conjugate transpose, inverse, and trace, re-
spectively. IM denotes a M ×M identity matrix. P {·} and
E(·) denote the probability and mathematical expectation, re-
spectively. ||·|| denotes the l2 norm. CN×M and RN×M denote
the spaces of all N ×M matrices with complex-valued and
real-valued elements, respectively. 〈x,y〉 = xHy denotes the
inner product. CN(µ,Σ) and N(µ,Σ) denote the distributions
of complex and real Gaussian random vectors, respectively,
with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. ΓS ,
∫∞
0 t
S−1e−tdt,
ΓS (x) ,
∫∞
x
tS−1e−tdt, and γS (x) ,
∫ x
0
tS−1e−tdt denote
the Gamma, the upper incomplete Gamma, and the lower
incomplete Gamma functions, respectively [50]. Φ (x) ,
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function [50, Eqn. 8.250.1].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a TDD system where multiple single antenna
Eves, who know their own CSIs, aim to intercept the signal
transmitted by a multiple antennas BS to a single antenna
LU by performing the PSA, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The con-
sidered single-LU system can model a time division multiple
access (TDMA) system with multiple users. More specifically,
assume that the BS divides the time into several time slots
having equal and fixed length. In each time slot, only one
user is scheduled and the BS serves the multiple users one-
by-one. Then, the user scheduled in a given time slot is the
LU whereas the users scheduled in other time slots may act
as Eves and attempt to intercept the data intended for the user
being currently served. Therefore, for simplicity and clarity,
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Fig. 1: Multiple Eves attack the training phase by transmitting pre-designed sequences to the BS.
we adopt a similar system model as in [23]–[27], i.e., we
consider only one time slot with one LU 1.
The legitimate transmission procedure comprises the uplink
training phase and the downlink data transmission phase. In
the uplink training phase, the LU sends a pilot sequence to
the BS for channel estimation. In the data transmission phase,
beamforming based on the estimated channel at the BS is
utilized to transmit data to the LU. Multiple Eves attack the
legitimate link in the uplink training phase by transmitting pre-
designed sequences to the BS. They aim to impair the CSI
acquisition of the BS so that the downlink beamforming will
be directed not only towards the LU but also towards the Eves.
In this paper, we assume that all the Eves transmit the same
pilot sequence as the LU when carrying out the PSA. Note that,
in general, the Eves can transmit any arbitrary pre-designed
sequences instead of the pilot sequence, of course. However, in
Remark 1, we will show later that transmitting other sequences
does not offer any advantage as far as intercepting the data is
concerned.
We use hB ∈ CN×1 and hE,k ∈ CN×1 to denote the
channel between the BS and the LU and the channel between
the BS and the kth Eve, respectively, whereN is the number of
antennas at the BS and all channel coefficients are independent
and identical distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables,
i.e., hB ∼ CN (0, IN ) and hE,k ∼ CN (0, IN ). In the uplink
training phase, the LU and the Eves send the same pilot
sequence x to the BS. The received signal at the BS, denoted
by Y T ∈ CN×τ , is given by
Y T =
√
PThBx
T +
∑K
k=1
νkhE,kx
T +U , (1)
1 In more sophisticated multi-user TDMA systems, the lengths of different
time slots may not be equal and fixed. More specifically, the times for serving
different users may be dynamically optimized according to the SNRs of the
users to achieve certain objectives. For example, the objective may be to
achieve fairness among the users or to satisfy different quality of service
requirements of the users. In this case, the PSA affects not only the SNRs
at the LU and Eves but also the optimal time allocation. Note that the
total amount of information that can be intercepted by the Eves depends
on both the wiretapping SNR and the length of the time slot allocated to
the LU. Evaluating the eavesdropping capability for this case is much more
complicated than for the case considered in this paper. In fact, compared to
existing works such as [23]–[27] where only one Eve is considered, in this
paper, we focus on the impact of multiple Eves. Further extensions to cases
where the BS adopts elaborated user scheduling schemes are left for future
work.
where the training sequence x ∈ Cτ×1 of length τ satisfies
xTx∗ = τ , PT is the training power of the LU, νk, for k =
1, 2, · · ·,K , are the complex weight coefficients of the kth
Eve, which will be optimized based on the Eves’ CSIs to
improve the wiretapping capability; U ∈ CN×τ is the additive
Gaussian white noise (AWGN) matrix at the BS with each
element being distributed as CN
(
0, σ2T
)
.
To estimate the channel of the LU, hB , the BS applies the
following transformation
yT ,
1
τ
√
PT
Y Tx
∗ = hB +
K∑
k=1
νk√
PT
hE,k + z, (2)
where z , 1
τ
√
PT
Ux∗ is the equivalent noise vector with
distribution CN
(
0,
σ2T
τPT
IN
)
. Then, based on yT , the BS
estimates hB by using the linear minimum mean square error
(LMMSE) method, which yields
hˆB = L
HyT , (3)
where L is the LMMSE estimation matrix. The construction
of L will be discussed later. After obtaining the estimated
channel, i.e., hˆB , the BS transmits the confidential message s
in the downlink data transmission phase using maximal-ratio
transmission (MRT) with beamforming vectorw , hˆB‖hˆB‖ [26],
[27]. The signals received by the LU and the kth Eve are
denoted by yLU and yE,k, respectively, and can be written as
yLU = h
H
B
hˆB
‖hˆB‖
s+ nLU , yE,k = h
H
E,k
hˆB
‖hˆB‖
s+ nE,k, (4)
where nLU ∼ CN
(
0, σ2LU
)
and nE,k ∼ CN
(
0, σ2E,k
)
are the
additive noise at the LU and the kth Eve, respectively.
Due to the PSA, the obtained hˆB is a function of both hB
and hE,k, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , which has two negative effects: on
the one hand, the MRT beamforming vector will not match the
legitimate channel hB , which leads to a power attenuation for
the LU; on the other hand, each Eve will receive a copy of
the leaked confidential signal. From the point of view of the
Eves, the PSA aims to maximize the received SNR of the
confidential signal at the Eves to achieve a better wiretapping
performance.
In this paper, we consider the case where the confidential
information has to be decoded in an online manner. Further-
more, we assume that the Eves are connected to each other
4via low-cost low-capacity wireless links. Hence, we assume
that the Eves can share their CSIs for performing the PSA but
are not capable of sharing the received information-carrying
signals to perform joint information decoding, i.e., the wireless
links between the Eves provide enough capacity for sharing
their CSIs but not enough capacity for sharing the real-time
information-carrying signals. For example, the Eves may be
distributed nodes which form a temporary low-cost wireless
ad hoc network to communicate with each other. In a wireless
ad hoc network, the wireless links between different pairs of
the nodes usually have different capacities, and for some node
pairs, the links between them may have very low capacity
due to shadowing and the long-distance transmission. As a
result, the CSIs of the Eves may be successfully shared as
the information content of the Eves’ CSI is generally small,
but it may not be possible to share the received information-
carrying signals at the Eves, which are usually of high rate,
to perform joint decoding. In this context, we also note that
the more information the Eves exchange, the easier it will be
for the legitimate system to detect their presence. Therefore,
in this paper, we assume that the Eves cooperate with each
other to perform the PSA during the channel training phase to
maximize the SNR at one of the Eve, referred to as the target
Eve, in the subsequent data transmission phase. The target
Eve performs decoding to obtain the confidential information2.
Without loss of generality, we take the Kth Eve as the
target Eve. More specifically, we formulate an optimization
problem for the weight coefficients νk, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K , in
(2) to maximize the SNR of the Kth Eve. The resulting
wiretapping performance can be regarded as a lower bound on
the performance when the Eves can perform joint information
decoding.
Depending on the capabilities of the BS, the following two
cases may be distinguished:
• The BS is completely unaware of the existence of the
PSA, i.e., the BS assumes that only the LU is transmitting
the pilot sequence during the training phase.
• The BS is cautious and after each uplink channel training
phase, a detection operation is executed to determine
whether a PSA has occurred. In this case, the Eves have
to design the PSA more carefully.
In the following sections, we discuss these two cases and
present the corresponding optimization problems one by one.
Remark 1: If the Eves transmit any other sequence qk, k =
1, 2, · · · ,K, instead of x in (1), then in the uplink training
phase, yT in (2) becomes y˜T = hB+
∑K
k=1
qTk x
∗
τ
√
PT
hE,k+z . It
is obvious that, as long as qTkx
∗ 6= 0, k = 1, 2, · · ·,K , holds,
y˜T is equivalent to yT if we let νk =
qTk x
∗
τ . Therefore, we
2 If the multiple Eves are connected via high-cost high-capacity backhaul
links or are co-located (i.e., a single Eve with multiple antennas), then they can
share their received signals and perform joint information decoding based on
all received signals. In this case, the Eves can jointly design the PSA signals
during the channel training phase and the combining weights during the data
transmission phase, which will lead to an improved interception performance.
However, this also substantially affects and complicates the wiretapping SNR
maximization problem. Hence, considering this case is beyond the scope of
this paper, but constitutes an interesting topic for future research.
assume that all Eves transmit x during the channel training
phase for simplicity.
III. PSA DESIGN WHEN THE BS IS UNAWARE OF THE PSA
In this section, we consider the case when the BS is
completely unaware of the PSA. In this scenario, the BS
regards the received pilot signals in the uplink training phase
as the legitimate channel coefficients polluted by noise. More
specifically, the BS will mistake yT = hB+
∑K
k=1
νk√
PT
hE,k+
z for yT = hB + z by ignoring the second term on
the right hand side of (2), and estimate hB according
to the LMMSE principle by setting L = τPT
τPT+σ2T
IN in
(3) [42]. Then, the estimated channel is given by hˆB =
α
(
hB +
∑K
k=1
νk√
PT
hE,k + z
)
= α (hB + hE + z), where
α , τPT
τPT+σ2T
and hE ,
∑K
k=1
νk√
PT
hE,k. Inserting hˆB
into (4), the signal received by the LU during the signal
transmission phase can be written as
yLU = ‖hˆB‖s︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal of the LU
+ h˜
H
B
hˆB
‖hˆB‖
s+ nLU︸ ︷︷ ︸
equivalent noise of the LU
, (5)
where nLU ∼ CN
(
0, σ2L
)
is the Gaussian noise, h˜B is the
channel estimation error satisfying hB = h˜B + hˆB which is
not known by the BS. In practice, when there is no attack,
h˜B is generally very small and thus, only the first term in
(5) is regarded as the desired signal of the LU and the other
terms are considered as the equivalent noise. To decode the
signal, the LU has to know the value of ‖hˆB‖, which could
be achieved by direct feedback from the BS.
According to the general principle of PLS, we do not
assume that the LU has CSI knowledge that the Eves do not
have. Therefore, we assume that the Eves will also know ‖hˆB‖
during the signal transmission phase. In fact, the Eves can
acquire this knowledge when the BS feeds back ‖hˆB‖ to the
LU. Then, the received signal of the Kth Eve in (4) can be
rewritten as
y˘E,K = ‖hˆB‖yE,K
= αhHE,KhEs︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+αhHE,KhBs+ αh
H
E,Kzs+ ‖hˆB‖nE,K︸ ︷︷ ︸
equivalent noise n˘E,K
. (6)
In the following, we analyze the SNR of the Kth Eve.
A. The SNR of Kth Eve
The first three terms on the right hand side of (6) contain
the signal s, and the desired signal of the Eves depends on
their prior knowledge of hB . In general, it is difficult for the
Eves to know the exact hB , and thus only the first term in
(6) is regarded as the desired signal for the Kth Eve and the
remaining terms are treated as equivalent noise, denoted by
n˘E,K . The equivalent noise power can be calculated as
E
(
|n˘E,K |2
)
= α2
(
PSσ
2
BT ‖hE,K‖2
+Nσ2BTσ
2
E,K + ‖hE‖2 σ2E,K
)
, (7)
5where PS , E
(
|s|2
)
is the signal power transmitted by
the BS, and σ2BT ,
(
1 +
σ2T
τPT
)
. Note that the expectation
operation in (7) is with respect to (w.r.t.) hB , z , s, and nE,K
because all of these variables are unknown to the Eves, and
thus are treated as random 3. Therefore, an achievable average
SNR of the Kth Eve can be written as
SNRE,K
=
PS
∣∣hHE,KhE∣∣2
PSσ2BT ‖hE,K‖2 +Nσ2BTσ2E,K + ‖hE‖2 σ2E,K
. (8)
In practice, the Eves can not obtain the exact CSI of the
LU. Nevertheless, it is of interest to consider the case where
the Eves know hB perfectly, because the corresponding SNR
constitutes an upper bound on the SNR when hB is not
or imperfectly known to the Eves. In fact, in practice, the
LU’s CSI is highly dependent on the LU’s location. If the
LU’s location is known to the Eves, they may be able to
infer partial knowledge of the LU’s CSI, which means the
actual eavesdropping performance is expected to be between
the performance when the Eves know hB perfectly and the
performance when the Eves do not have any knowledge of
hB . Hence, considering the case where the Eves know hB
perfectly yields an upper bound on the maximum performance
that the Eves can achieve by performing the PSA. Note that
similar assumptions have been made in several existing works,
e.g., [39], [40]. With this pessimistic assumption for the LU,
both the first and second terms on the right hand side of (6)
constitute the desired signal for the Kth Eve. In this case, an
achievable average SNR is given by
SNRE,K
=
PS
∣∣hHE,KhE + hHE,KhB∣∣2
PSσ2T
τPT
‖hE,K‖2 +N σ
2
T
τPT
σ2E,K + ‖hE + hB‖2 σ2E,K
. (9)
B. Design of the Attacking Scheme
According to the discussions in Section II, the goal of the
PSA is to maximize the SNR of the Kth Eve. Based on (8)
and (9), we establish the following optimization problem
max
ν∈D
∣∣αHν + θ∣∣2
‖Aν + γ‖2 + ̺ , (10)
where D , {ν | |νk|2 ≤ Pk, k = 1, 2, · · ·,K},
ν , [ν1, ν2, · · ·, νK ]T , with Pk being the power
constraint of the kth Eve, A , 1√
PT
[hE,1,hE,2, · · ·,hE,K ],
α , AHhE,K , and if hB is unknown, we have {̺, θ,γ} ={
PSσ
2
BT
σ2E,K
‖hE,K‖2 +Nσ2BT , 0,0
}
, otherwise, we have
{̺, θ,γ} =
{
PSσ
2
T
τPTσ2E,K
‖hE,K‖2 +N σ
2
T
τPT
,hHE,KhB,hB
}
.
Note that we assume an individual power constraint for each
3 Although we have assumed in (6) that the Eves know ‖hˆB‖ for decoding,
they do not know ‖hˆB‖ for designing the PSA signals. This is because hˆB
is the estimated CSI at the BS and can only be obtained after the training
phase. The design of the PSA signals has to occur before the training phase,
and at this time, the Eves do not know ‖hˆB‖ in (6).
Eve in (10) instead of a total power constraint, since the
Eves are at different locations and can not share their power
resources.
The objective function in (10) is the ratio of two convex
quadratic functions, which is generally not a concave function.
Therefore, problem (10) is a non-convex optimization problem
and difficult to solve. Before providing an efficient algorithm
to handle the problem, we first investigate the second scenario
where the BS is more cautious and intelligent in ensuring
secrecy transmissions.
IV. PSA DESIGN WHEN THE BS TRIES TO DETECT THE
PSA
In this section, we consider the case where the BS is
cautious, and after each uplink training phase, performs a
detection operation based on the received pilot signal to deter-
mine whether a PSA has occurred. Once the BS suspects that a
PSA has been performed, it terminates the signal transmission
phase to protect the confidential message. Hence, the Eves
have to be careful when performing the PSA to avoid being
detected, i.e., they will try to conceal the PSA. In this section,
we assume that the Eves do not know the CSI between the BS
and the LU, i.e., hB . We first derive the probability that the
PSA is successfully detected by the BS, and then we formulate
the PSA design problem such that the SNR of the Kth Eve is
maximized while the probability of being detected is below a
pre-designed limit.
A. Successful Detection Probability
The BS performs PSA detection before downlink data
transmission. The detection operation can be formulated as
the following binary hypothesis test problem,
yT =
{
hB + z, H0,
hB + hE + z, H1,
(11)
where the null hypothesis H0 stands for the absence of the
PSA and the alternative hypothesisH1 represents the presence
of the PSA. According to the detection model in (11), we
derive expressions for the successful detection probability
under the general case and the worst case for the Eves
depending on the BS’s prior knowledge of hE .
1) General case for the Eves: In general, it is difficult for
the BS to obtain the exact value of hE . Therefore, the BS
will model the aggregated channel hE for H1 in (11) as an
unknown complex-valued vector parameter. According to (11),
the BS will model the distribution of yT as
yT ∼
{
CN
(
0, σ2BTIN
)
, H0,
CN
(
hE , σ
2
BTIN
)
, H1,
. (12)
Note that hE in (12) is unknown by the BS, and therefore, we
assume that it resorts to the generalized logarithm likelihood
test [42] to distinguish between H0 and H1, which can be
mathematically expressed as
T (yT ) = ln
max
hE
f (yT |H1,hE)
f (yT |H0) =
‖yT ‖2
σ2BT
RH1H0 ΛG, (13)
6where ΛG is the decision threshold which is set by the BS
according to a pre-defined acceptable false alarm probability
ηG (0 < ηG < 1). The false alarm probability P(F )G is the
probability that the BS mistakenly concludes that the PSA
has occurred when the Eves are indeed not attacking, and can
be expressed as
P(F )G , P {T (yT ) > ΛG|H0} . (14)
The BS requires that the false alarm probability P(F )G does not
exceed a pre-defined value η, i.e.,
P(F )G
(a)
= P
{
‖yT ‖2 ≥ σ2BTΛG|H0
}
(b)
=
1
ΓN
∫ +∞
σ2BTΛG
rN−1
(σ2BT )
N
e
− r
σ2
BT dr
=
1
ΓN
ΓN (ΛG) ≤ ηG, (15)
where (a) is obtained by inserting (13) into (14) and (b)
follows from the fact that conditioned on H0, ‖yT ‖2 is a
Gamma random variable with shape and scale parameters
given by N and σ2BT , respectively. From (13), we observe
that a higher value of ΛG results in a lower successful
detection probability, and from (15), we can see that P(F )G is
monotonically decreasing in ΛG. Therefore, we assume the
BS sets P(F )G = ηG to maximize the successful detection
probability, which leads to ΛG = Γ
−1
N (ηGΓN ), where Γ
−1
N (y)
is the inverse function of ΓN (x). Inserting ΛG into (13) leads
to
‖yT ‖2 RH1H0 EG, EG , σ2BTΓ−1N (ηGΓN ) . (16)
According to (16), the BS computes ‖yT ‖2 after each uplink
channel training phase. If ‖yT ‖2 < EG, it concludes that there
is no PSA, otherwise, it assumes that the PSA has occurred.
On the other hand, the Eves know the value of the ag-
gregate channel hE . Therefore when attacking, they model
the probability density function (PDF) of yT as fE (yT ) =
e−‖yT−hE‖2/σ2BT
πN(σ2BT )
N . Combining fE (yT ) with the detection cri-
terion of the BS in (16), we obtain the successful detection
probability of the PSA as a function of ‖hE‖, i.e.,
P(D)G (‖hE‖)
,P
{
‖yT ‖2 > EG|H1
}
= P
{
2 ‖yT ‖2
σ2BT
> 2Γ−1N (ηGΓN )
}
=1− e−
‖hE‖2
σ2
BT
+∞∑
j=0
‖hE‖2j Q2N+2j
(
2Γ−1N (ηGΓN )
)
j!σ2jBT
, (17)
where Qk(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
a central chi-square distributed random variable with k degrees
of freedom defined as Qk (x) =
γk/2(x2 )
Γk/2
.
2) Worst case for the Eves: We also consider a worst case
for the Eves where the aggregate channel hE is known by
the BS during the detection procedure. In this case, from the
perspective of the BS, the distribution of yT is given by
yT ∼
{
CN
(
0, σ2BTIN
)
, H0,
CN
(
hE , σ
2
BTIN
)
, H1,
(18)
where hE now is a known parameter for the BS. Assume
the BS determines whether the PSA has occurred through the
logarithm likelihood test. Then, the logarithm likelihood ratio
is given by
T (yT ) = ln
f (yT |H1)
f (yT |H0) =
yHT hE + h
H
EyT − hHEhE
σ2BT
. (19)
By inserting (18) into (19), it can be proved that if H0
is true, then T (yT ) is distributed as N
(
− ‖hE‖2
σ2BT
, 2‖hE‖
2
σ2BT
)
,
otherwise, the distribution of T (yT ) is N
(
‖hE‖2
σ2BT
, 2‖hE‖
2
σ2BT
)
.
Thus, the decision between H0 and H1 corresponds to a
decision between two Gaussian random variables with equal
variance and opposite means. The detection operation can be
written as
T (yT ) RH1H0 ΛW , (20)
where the BS set the threshold ΛW to ensure that the false
alarm probability P(F )W is below an acceptable value ηW , i.e.,
P(F )W = P {T (yT ) > ΛW |H0}
=
σBT
2
√
π ‖hE‖
∫ +∞
ΛW
e
− (
t+‖hE‖2/σ2BT )
2
4‖hE‖2/σ2BT dt
=
1
2
(
1− Φ
( ‖hE‖
2σBT
+
σBTΛW
2 ‖hE‖
))
≤ ηW . (21)
By setting P(F )W = ηW , the BS obtains the maximal successful
detection probability, and in this case, we have
ΛW =
‖hE‖
σBT
(
2Φ−1 (1− 2ηW )− ‖hE‖
σBT
)
, (22)
where Φ−1 (·) is the inverse function of the error function
Φ (·). According to the decision criterion in (20), the success-
ful detection probability is given by
P(D)W (‖hE‖) = P {T (yT ) > ΛW |H1}
=
σBT
2
√
π ‖hE‖
∫ +∞
ΛW
e
−(
t−‖hE‖2/σ2BT )
2
4‖hE‖2/σ2BT dx
=
1
2
(
1− Φ
(
−‖hE‖
2σBT
+
σBTΛW
2 ‖hE‖
))
(∗)
=
1
2
(
1− Φ
(
−‖hE‖
σBT
+Φ−1 (1− 2ηW )
))
, (23)
where for step (∗), (22) was used. So far, we have derived
the probabilities that the PSA is successfully detected by the
BS for the general and the worst cases in (17) and (23),
respectively. In the next subsection, we will use (17) and (23)
to formulate the PSA design problem.
B. Attacking Scheme Design
If the Eves are aware that the BS will perform PSA
detection, they will attempt to conceal their attack. More
specifically, when they attack, they will try to make the
PSA detection probability as small as possible to trigger the
transmission of the confidential signal in the downlink data
transmission phase. To achieve this, the Eves design the PSA
7signal such that the successful detection probability remains
under an acceptable threshold ǫ, i.e.,
P(D) (‖hE‖) ≤ ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1, (24)
where we have
P(D) (‖hE‖) ,
{
P(D)G (‖hE‖) , for general case,
P(D)W (‖hE‖) , for worst case.
(25)
Based on (24), to maximize the SNR of the Kth Eve while
avoiding being successfully detected, we establish the follow-
ing optimization problem
max
ν∈D
∣∣αHν ∣∣2
‖Aν‖2 + ̺ , (26a)
s.t. P(D) (‖hE‖) ≤ ǫ. (26b)
Compared to (10), problem (26) is even more difficult to solve
because of constraint (26b). Fortunately, by checking the first
order derivatives of both P(D)G (x) and P(D)W (x), we conclude
that both P(D)G (x) and P(D)W (x) are monotonically increasing
functions w.r.t. x in the region (0,+∞). Therefore, we can
express constraint (26b) equivalently as
‖hE‖2 = ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2, (27)
where ̟ satisfies P(D) (̟) = ǫ and can be obtained by the
bisection method due to the monotonicity of P(D)(x). We note
that (27) is a convex quadratic constraint. Considering (27),
(26) can be transformed into the following equivalent problem,
max
ν∈D
∣∣αHν ∣∣2
‖Aν‖2 + ̺ , s.t. ‖Aν‖
2 ≤ ̟2. (28)
However, problem (28) is still non-convex due to the non-
convex objective function, and thus still difficult to solve.
In Section III-B and Section IV-B, we have formulated two
non-convex optimization problems for the PSA, i.e., (10) and
(28). In the next section, we propose an efficient algorithm to
solve these problems.
V. MM-ADMM-BASED METHOD FOR PSA OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we present an efficient method to solve (10)
and (28). We observe that (10) and (28) are special cases of
the following optimization problem
max
ν∈D
S (ν) ,
∣∣αHν + θ∣∣2
‖Aν + γ‖2 + ̺ , s.t. ‖Aν‖
2 ≤ ̟2. (29)
In fact, by setting ̟ → +∞, the constraint ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2 can
be ignored and (29) degrades to (10), and by setting θ = 0
and γ = 0, (29) simplifies to (28). Therefore, in this section,
we focus on solving (29).
We have already established that the difficulty in solving
(29) lies in the non-convexity of the objective function. The
idea behind the proposed algorithm is to first transform the
original non-convex problem into a series of convex problems
by invoking the MM principle [31], [32] and solving them iter-
atively. In each iteration, one convex problem has to be solved.
Though general convex optimization tools, such as CVX [48],
can solve the obtained convex problems, these tools may not
be efficient because they are designed for general convex
programs. Therefore, we further propose an ADMM-based low
complexity algorithm to solve the obtained convex problem.
The ADMM algorithm decomposes the convex problem into
several sub-problems, each of which either has a closed-form
solution or can be solved by the bisection method or Newton’s
method. Besides, part of the obtained sub-problems can be
solved in parallel, which can be exploited for a more efficient
implementation. The whole MM-ADMM algorithm converges
to a stationary point of the original non-convex problem. We
show via simulation that the resulting MM-ADMM method is
computationally very efficient. Brief introductions to the MM
method and the ADMM algorithm are provided in Appendix
A and Appendix B, respectively.
Finally, we provide an alternative method for solving a
special case of (29) when θ = 0 and γ = 0 based on SDR.
We also provide a sufficient condition for when the SDR-
based method can achieve the global optimum. The SDR-
based method will be used as a benchmark to verify the
efficiency of the proposed MM-ADMM algorithm in Section
VI.
A. MM-ADMM-based Low Complexity Algorithm
In the first step of our approach to solve (29), we use the
MM method to transform the problem into a convex one.
The MM method maximizes the original objective function by
iteratively maximizing a series of lower bounds on the original
objective function. In each iteration, it constructs a lower
bound to be employed as the current objective function based
on the solution obtained in the previous iteration. Assume the
solution of problem (29) obtained from the previous iteration
is denoted by νˆ , then a lower bound on the original objective
is provided in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. A lower bound on the objective function of (29)
is given by
Sˆ (ν ; νˆ) , −a ‖Aν + γ‖2 + 2bℜ{βHν}− c
≤
∣∣αHν + θ∣∣2
‖Aν + γ‖2 + ̺ (30)
where ν ∈ CK×1 is an arbitrary complex vector, a ,
|αHνˆ+θ|2
(‖Aνˆ+γ‖2+̺)2
, b , 1‖Aνˆ+γ‖2+̺ , c , a̺ +
2ℜ{(νˆHα+θ∗)θ}
‖Aνˆ+γ‖2+̺ ,
and β , α
(
αHνˆ + θ
)
.
Proof: For any x ∈ C and y ∈ (0,+∞), f (x; y) ,
|x|2
y is jointly convex w.r.t. (x, y) [49]. Therefore, f (x; y)
satisfies f (x; y) ≥ f (xˆ; yˆ) + 2ℜ{(x− xˆ)∗∇x∗f (xˆ; yˆ)} +
∇yf (xˆ; yˆ) (y − yˆ), where xˆ ∈ C, yˆ ∈ (0,+∞),
∇x∗f (xˆ; yˆ) = xˆyˆ , and ∇yf (xˆ; yˆ) = − xˆ
H xˆ
yˆ2 . By replacing x
with αHν + θ and y with ‖Aν + γ‖2 + ̺, we directly obtain
Lemma 1.
It can be verified that the lower bound provided in Lemma
1 satisfies the conditions stated in Appendix A for applying
8the MM method. Therefore, we can solve (29) by iteratively
solving the following problem
max
ν∈D
Sˆ (ν ; νˆ) , s.t. ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2. (31)
Problem (31) maximizes a concave quadratic function under
K + 1 convex quadratic constraints, and thus is a convex
problem.
Next, we propose an ADMM-based algorithm to obtain the
global optimum of this convex problem. The main advantage
of the proposed method is that we can decompose problem
(31) into several subproblems and each of them either has a
closed-form solution or can be efficiently solved by the bisec-
tion method or Newton’s method. To this end, we introduce a
new variable Ξ , [Ξ1,Ξ2, · · ·,ΞK ]T and transform problem
(31) into the following equivalent form,
min
ν∈X1;Ξ∈X2
a ‖Aν + γ‖2 − 2bℜ{1TΞ} , s.t. Ξ = Bν, (32)
where X2 ,
{
Ξ| |Ξk|2 ≤ |βk|2 Pk, ∀k = 1, 2, · · ·,K
}
, X1 ,{
ν | ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2
}
, B , diag (β∗), 1 , [1, 1, · · ·, 1]T ∈
RK×1, and βk is the kth element of β . According to the
ADMM principle introduced in Appendix B, the procedure for
solving (32) consists of iterating the following updates from
the (n− 1)th step to the nth step,
ν (n) = argmin
‖Aν‖2≤̟2


a ‖Aν + γ‖2 + ρ
2
∥∥∥Bν −Ξ(n−1)∥∥∥2
+ ℜ
{〈
y(n−1),Bν −Ξ(n−1)
〉}

 ,
(33a)
Ξ(n) = argmin
|Ξk|2≤|βk|2Pk
k=1,2,···,K


− 2bℜ{1TΞ}+ ρ
2
∥∥∥Bν (n) −Ξ∥∥∥2
+ ℜ
{〈
y(n−1),Bν (n) −Ξ
〉}

 ,
(33b)
y(n) = y(n−1) + ρ
(
Bν (n) −Ξ(n)
)
, (33c)
where ρ can be chosen as any positive real number and
{ν (n),Ξ(n), y(n)} denotes the results obtained in the nth
iteration. The iterations in (33) can be efficiently carried out
as follows.
1) Update of ν (n): In fact, (33a) is a convex quadratic prob-
lem, which means the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are sufficient and necessary for the globally optimal solution
[49]. The KKT conditions for (33a) are
(a+ ζ)Tν +
ρ
2
Y ν −µ = 0, (34a)
ζ ≥ 0, ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2, ζ
(
‖Aν‖2 −̟2
)
= 0, (34b)
where T , AHA, Y , BHB , µ , ρ2B
HΞ(n−1) −
1
2B
Hy(n−1), and ζ is the dual variable w.r.t. the constraint
‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2. According to (34a), ν is a function of ζ as
ν (ζ) =
(
(a+ ζ)T +
ρ
2
Y
)−1
µ. (35)
According to (34b), if ‖Aν (0) ‖2 ≤ ̟2, then we
have ν (n) = ν (0), otherwise, we have to search for
ζ′ such that ν (ζ′)H Tν (ζ′) = 0 within (0,+∞).
Note that ν (ζ)
H
Tν (ζ) =
∑K
k=1
µ′kΠk
(ρ/2+(a+ζ)Πk)2
is a convex decreasing function w.r.t. ζ, where
µ′ = [µ′1, µ
′
2 · · · , µ′K ]T = QHY −
1
2µ and
Z = Qdiag {Π}QH is the eigenvalue decomposition
with Z , Y − 12TY − 12 and Π, with its kth element denoted
by Πk, is a vector containing all the eigenvalues of Z .
Therefore, we can solve ν (ζ′)H Tν (ζ′) = 0 using the
bisection method or Newton’s method [35]. Once we obtain
ζ′, we have ν (n) = ν (ζ′).
Note that for solving (10), the constraint ‖Aν‖2 ≤ ̟2 in
(29) is absent. Hence, (33a) becomes an unconstraint convex
quadratic problem, and we can obtain the optimal solution in
closed form by the first order condition [49]. Setting the first
order derivative to zero, we directly obtain
ν (n) =
(
aT +
ρ
2
Y
)−1
µ. (36)
2) Update of Ξ(n): Problem (33b) contains K inequality
constraints, which complicates the problem. However, by
exploiting its special structure, we can decompose (33b) into
K parallel sub-problems, and the optimal solutions of these
sub-problems is the optimal solution of (33b). The kth sub-
problem is
min
|Ξk|2≤|βk|2Pk


ρ
2
∣∣∣β∗kν(n)k − Ξk∣∣∣2 − 2bℜ{Ξk}
+ ℜ
{(
y
(n−1)
k
)∗ (
β∗kν
(n)
k − Ξk
)}

 . (37)
In fact, this sub-problem has a closed-form solution. The
Lagrangian function of (37) is given by
Lk (Ξk, λk) =
ρ
2
∣∣∣β∗kν(n)k − Ξk∣∣∣2 −ℜ{2bΞk}
+ ℜ
{(
y
(n−1)
k
)∗ (
β∗kν
(n)
k − Ξk
)}
+ λk
(
|Ξk|2 − |βk|2 Pk
)
,
where λk ≥ 0 is the dual variable w.r.t. constraint |Ξk|2 ≤
|βk|2 Pk. The first order condition is
∂Lk
∂Ξ∗k
=
ρ
(
Ξk − β∗kν(n)k
)
2
− b− y
(n−1)
k
2
+ λΞk = 0, (38)
and therefore, we obtain
Ξk (λk) =
b +
y
(n−1)
k
2 +
ρ
2β
∗
kν
(n)
k
ρ
2 + λk
. (39)
According to the complementary slackness condition [49], the
optimal dual variable λoptk has to satisfy∣∣Ξk (λoptk )∣∣2 ≤ |βk|2 Pk, λk ≥ 0,
λoptk
(∣∣Ξk (λoptk )∣∣2 − |βk|2 Pk) = 0. (40)
According to (40), if |Ξk (0)|2 ≤ |βk|2 Pk , we have λoptk = 0
and Ξoptk = Ξk (0). Otherwise, we have to solve the equation∣∣Ξk (λoptk )∣∣2 − |βk|2 Pk = 0, which leads to
λoptk =
∣∣∣∣b+ y(n−1)k 2 + ρ2β∗kν(n)k
∣∣∣∣
|βk|
√
Pk
− ρ
2
,
Ξoptk = Ξk
(
λoptk
)
.
(41)
9Algorithm 1 MM-ADMM-based algorithm for solving (29)
1: Initialize νˆ satisfying |νˆk|2 ≤ Pk, k = 1, 2, · · ·,K , and
‖Aνˆ‖ ≤ ̟2;
2: Initialize nM = 0;
3: Repeat:
4: nM = nM + 1;
5: Compute a, b, β according to Lemma 1 and set B =
diag (β∗);
6: Initialize Ξ(0) = νˆ , y(0) = 0 and set nA = 0, SNRIni =
S (νˆ);
7: Repeat:
8: nA = nA + 1;
9: Compute ν (nA) according to (35) or (36);
10: Compute Ξ(nA) according to (41);
11: Update y(nA) = y(nA−1) + ρ
(
Bν (nA) −Ξ(nA));
12: Until:
∣∣∣∣ Sˆ(ν (nA);νˆ)−Sˆ(ν (nA−1);νˆ)Sˆ(ν (nA);νˆ)
∣∣∣∣ < δA or nA ≥ TMAXA .
13: Set νˆ = ν (nA);
14: Until:
∣∣∣S(νˆ)−SNRIniS(νˆ) ∣∣∣ < δM or nM ≥ TMAXM .
Combining all steps from (31) to (41), we now summarize
the algorithm proposed for solving (29) in Algorithm 1,
where δM and δA are small positive numbers determining
the accuracy of the MM and the ADMM algorithms, respec-
tively, and TMAXM and T
MAX
A are the maximum numbers of
iterations allowable for the MM and the ADMM algorithms,
respectively.
B. Initialization, Convergence, and Complexity Analysis of the
MM-ADMM Algorithm
1) Initialization: To run Algorithm 1, we need to initialize
νˆ , i.e., step 1 in Algorithm 1. This can be easily done by
randomly generating a vector ν˘ and setting νˆ = χν˘ where χ
is a scaling factor which is chosen such that all constraints are
fulfilled.
2) Convergence: We observe that
1) the ADMM algorithm in (33) is guaranteed to converge to
the global optimal solution of (31) [33]–[36];
2) by iteratively solving (31), the MM method will converge
to a stationary point of the original problem (29) [31], [32].
Based on these two observations, we conclude that the MM-
ADMM algorithm converges to a stationary point of problem
(29).
3) Complexity analysis: The MM-ADMM algorithm solves
(29) by iteratively solving (32) via the ADMM algorithm.
Therefore, we only analyze the complexity of solving (32).
Using the ADMM algorithm, we iteratively update {ν, Ξ, y}
in (38). Updating ν requires performing an eigenvalue decom-
position w.r.t. matrix Z and solving an equation via Newton’s
method. The complexity of these operations is on the order of
K3+JNK , where JN is the number of iterations for Newton’s
method. The updates of Ξ and y only require multiplications,
and the corresponding complexity is on the order of K . We
note that when iterating (33), we only need to perform the
eigenvalue decomposition once because matrix Z remains
constant during the whole iterative procedure. Therefore, the
complexity of solving (32) using the ADMM algorithm is
on the order of K3 + JAJNK , where JA is the number of
iterations needed for convergence. The numerical results in
Section VI show that tens of iterations are generally enough
for the algorithm to converge to a solution with a relative error
less than 10−4. Since (32) is a convex problem, it can also be
solved by general convex optimization tools. For example, the
SDPT3 solver of CVX solves (32) by the interior method,
which requires the computation of the inverse of a Hessian
matrix in each iteration. This entails a complexity on the order
ofK3. The number of iterations required to reach an ε-optimal
solution is on the order of
√
K ln
(
1
ε
)
[37], [38]. Therefore,
the complexity of solving (32) using the SDPT3 solver is
about ln
(
1
ε
)√
K×K3. If we set ε = 10−4, the computational
complexity is about 9.2
√
K×K3. Compared with the ADMM
algorithm, using CVX for solving (32) is more complex and
also more time consuming as will be shown in the simulation
section.
C. An SDR-based Method
In this subsection, we provide an alternative SDR-based
method to solve a special case of (29), namely, when the Eves
do not know the value of hB . In this case, we have θ = 0
and γ = 0. This method is used as a benchmark for the MM-
ADMM algorithm developed in the previous subsection. First,
defining V = ννH , we rewrite (29) in the following equivalent
form,
max
V 0
Tr (ΘV )
Tr (TV ) + ̺
, (42a)
s.t. Tr (DkV ) ≤ Pk, ∀k = 1, 2, · · ·,K, (42b)
Tr (TV ) ≤ ̟2, rank (V ) = 1, (42c)
whereT , AHA,Θ , ααH , andDk is aK×K matrix whose
kth entry on the main diagonal is 1 and all other entries are
0. Then, we introduce two new variables X and κ and apply
the Charnes-Cooper transformation [41] by setting V =X/κ.
In this way, (42) becomes
max
X0;κ
rank(X)=1
Tr (ΘX ) , (43a)
s.t. Tr (DkX )− κPk ≤ 0, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ K, (43b)
Tr (TX )− κ̟2 ≤ 0, (43c)
Tr (TX ) + κ̺ = 1, (43d)
By using the SDR technique, we ignore the non-convex rank-
one constraint and (43) becomes
max
X0;κ
Tr (ΘX ) , s.t. (43b)− (43d), (44)
which is a convex semidefine program (SDP) and can be
solved by general convex optimization tools. In general, (44)
is not equivalent to (43) due to the omission of the rank-one
constraint. However, if the optimal solution of (44) is rank-
one, then it is also an optimal solution of (43). A sufficient
condition for the optimal solution of (44) to be rank-one is
provided in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. If the number of the Eves, K , and the number
of the antennas at the BS, N , satisfy K ≤ N , then the solution
to problem (44) is a rank-one solution with probability one.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
In practice, both scenarios with K ≤ N and K > N are
possible. If K ≤ N , according to Proposition 1, the SDR-
based method provides a global optimal solution of (43). If
K > N , a rank-one solution can not be guaranteed, and
thus the SDR-based solution provides only an upper bound
for (43) due to the relaxation of the rank constraint. However,
exhaustive numerical experiments, see Section VI, suggest that
the solution obtained with the SDR-based method is rank-one
or near rank-one even when K > N , and thus near globally
optimal. The results obtained with the SDR-based method will
serve as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency of the MM-
ADMM algorithm in Section VI.
Complexity analysis and comparison: In (44), there are
K2 variables, K + 2 inequality constraints, and one equality
constraint. Therefore, the complexity of solving (44) is on
the order of K6.5 [37], [38]. Compared to the complexity
of the MM-ADMM algorithm in Algorithm 1, the SDR-
based method is considerably more complex, which will be
confirmed by simulations in the next section.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the
efficiency of the proposed method and the impact of the PSA
performed by multiple Eves. In our simulations, we normalize
σ2T = σ
2
E,k = 0 dBm, k = 1, 2, ···,K , for convenience and we
assume that all Eves have the same attacking power, i.e., Pk =
P, k = 1, 2, · · ·,K . To terminate the MM-ADMM algorithm
given in Algorithm 1, we set TMAXA = 5, T
MAX
M = 500,
δM = 10
−3, and δM = 10−4 in all simulations.
A. Convergence of the MM-ADMM Algorithm
The convergence behavior of Algorithm 1 is shown in
Fig. 2. In Fig. 2(a), we plot the optimized SNRs versus the
iteration steps for 4 random channel realizations. From Fig.
2(a), we observe that for all considered channel realizations,
the MM-ADMM algorithm converges. In Fig. 2(b), for 30
randomly generated channel realizations, the numbers of itera-
tions needed for the algorithm to converge are plotted. As can
be observed, 100 iterations are enough for the MM-ADMM
algorithm to converge in most cases.
B. Efficiency of the Proposed MM-ADMM Algorithm
To show the efficiency of the MM-ADMM algorithm, we
compare the MM-ADMM algorithm with other methods in
terms of the average time 4 required for obtaining the final
solution and the wiretapping performance in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3,
4 The complexity of the MM-ADMM algorithm depends on the number of
iterations required for convergence, which is difficult to analyze. Therefore,
to be able to compare the relative computational complexities of different
methods, we resort to the average simulation time as performance criterion.
Note that using the average simulation time to compare the computational
complexity of different optimization algorithm is common in the related
literature, see e.g., [46], [47].
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Fig. 2: The convergence of the MM-ADMM algorithm. We set N =
8, K = 3, PS = 20 (dBm), PT = 10 (dBm), P = 10 (dBm), and
ρ = 0.01.
we consider the case where the BS has no prior knowledge of
hE and attempts to detect the PSA by setting the false alarm
probability as ηG = 0.05.
In Fig. 3(a), we compare the MM-ADMM algorithm in
Algorithm 1 with the following two methods in terms of the
time required to solve (29),
1) SDR-CVX: This method is described in Section V-B, and
is guaranteed to find the global optimum for K ≤ N .
2) MM-CVX: In this method, we use the MM method to
transform (29) into (31), and use CVX to solve (31).
The average simulation times in Fig. 3(a) are obtained by
using the timing instruction of the commercial MATLAB
software, i.e., ‘tic’ and ‘toc’, and are averaged across 1000
random channel realizations. As can be observed, the proposed
MM-ADMM method is much faster than the two competing
methods.
In Fig. 3(b), we investigate the rank of the solution obtained
with the SDR-based method when K > N . To this end,
we plot the largest and the second largest eigenvalues of the
solutions X for 50 random channel realizations. From Fig.
3(b), we see that the second largest eigenvalues are orders
of magnitude smaller than the largest eigenvalues, i.e., the
obtained solutions are approximately rank-one. In fact, we
have done a vast number of numerical experiments, but failed
to obtain a solution where the ratio between the second largest
and the largest eigenvalues exceeded 10−6. This means that
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Fig. 3: Comparison of different methods, where N = 10, P = 8 (dBm), PT = 10 (dBm), PS = 20 (dBm), ηG = 0.05, and ǫ = 0.2.
though without theoretical guarantee, the SDR-based method
is expected to find a near-global optimum in many cases, even
when K > N .
In Fig. 3(c), we show the wiretapping SNR achieved by the
MM-ADMM algorithm and the upper bound of the wiretap-
ping SNR obtained with the SDR-based method (due to the
relaxation of the rank-one constraint). The results are averaged
over 1000 random channel realizations. From Fig. 3(c), we can
see that the MM-ADMM method achieves almost the same
performance as the upper bound obtained with the SDR-based
method for both K ≤ N and K > N .
In summary, the proposed MM-ADMM algorithm is com-
putationally more efficient than the SDR-based method but
achieves practically the same performance.
C. The BS is Unaware of the PSA
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the SNR of the target Eve under the
condition that the BS is unaware of the PSA.
In Fig. 4(a), we compare the performances of the cooper-
ative attacking scheme (CAS) proposed in this paper with a
non-cooperative attacking scheme (NCAS). In the NCAS, each
Eve transmits with the maximal power by setting νk =
√
P
for k = 1, 2, · · ·,K without cooperating with the other Eves
to optimize the PSA. The results are obtained by averaging
w.r.t. 1000 channel realizations. For each channel realization,
the SNR of the NCAS is obtained by choosing the maximal
wiretapping SNR across all Eves. From Fig. 4(a), we can
observe that cooperation among Eves leads to significantly
higher wiretapping SNRs.
In Fig. 4(b), the wiretapping SNR in (8), where the Eves do
not have knowledge of hB , and its upper bound in (9), where
hB is known by the Eves, are plotted. As can be observed,
the wiretapping SNR decreases with increasing PT , since a
higher training power makes the channel estimation procedure
more robust against the PSA. However, we also observe that
increasing PT can not significantly reduce the wiretapping
performances when hB is known by the Eves. Therefore, from
the perspective of secure transmission, the legitimate links
should always keep their CSIs secret from the Eves.
D. PSA Against Detection
Now, we assume the BS attempts to detect the PSA and
the Eves design the PSA accordingly. The performances of
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(a) The wiretapping SNR versus the number of Eves K . We
set PT = 10 (dBm) and PS = 20 (dBm).
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(b) The wiretapping SNR versus the training power of the
LU. We set N = 12, P = 5 (dBm) and PS = 10 (dBm).
Fig. 4: Wiretapping performance when there is no detection at the
BS.
the attacking scheme under the general case, where the BS
does not know hE , and the worst case, where the BS knows
hE , are simulated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively. We set
ηG = ηW = 0.05, PS = 20 dBm , N = 8, and K = 3.
In Fig. 5, we show the wiretapping SNRs versus the
attacking power constraint for different training powers PT .
As can be observed from Fig. 5, for all cases, for high P , the
wiretapping SNRs become saturated. This is because higher
attacking powers make the PSA easier to detect by the BS, and
when the attacking power is sufficiently high, the wiretapping
performance is limited by the detection probability.
Fig. 6 shows the wiretapping SNR as a function of the
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Fig. 5: The wiretapping SNR versus the attack power constraint P ,
where we set the upper bound on the detection probability to ǫ = 0.2
for the general case in (a) and to ǫ = 0.4 for the worst case in (b).
upper bound on the detection probability for different attacking
power constraints. From Fig. 6, we observe a trade-off between
the wiretapping performance and the risk of the PSA of being
detected. If a higher wiretapping SNR is desired, the risk of
being detected increases. On the contrary, if the Eves want to
avoid detection of the PSA, then the wiretapping performance
will suffer.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the case where the PSA is
carried out by multiple Eves. We assumed that the Eves col-
laborate during the training phase to maximize the wiretapping
SNR of a target Eve and studied two different scenarios: (1) the
BS is unaware of the PSA, and (2) the BS attempts to detect
the PSA. For both scenarios, wiretapping SNR maximization
problems were formulated and unified into one general non-
convex optimization problem. An efficient MM-ADMM-based
algorithm was developed to solve the general problem. Our
simulation results reveal that: a) the MM-ADMM algorithm
achieves near-optimal performance, b) the cooperation among
Eves can significantly improve their wiretapping capability, c)
the CSIs of the legitimate links should be kept secret from the
Eves, otherwise, high wiretapping SNRs can be attained even
for low attacking powers, and d) if the Eves desire a higher
wiretapping performance, they have to take a higher risk of
being detected.
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Fig. 6: The wiretapping SNR versus the upper bound on the detection
probability ǫ, where we set PT = 5 dBm.
APPENDIX
A. Brief introduction to the MM method
For a general optimization problem max
x∈X
f(x), where X
is a convex set, the objective function may be in a compli-
cated form, which makes the problem intractable. The MM
method deals with this challenge by iteratively solving xn =
maxx∈X g (x;xn−1) starting from a feasible initial point x0,
where g (x;xn−1) is an approximate function of f (x) and
xn is the solution obtained in the n
th iteration. If g (x;xn−1)
satisfies g (x;xn−1) ≤ f (x), g (xn−1;xn−1) = f (xn−1) and
∂g(x;xn−1)
∂x |x=xn−1 = ∂f(x)∂x |x=xn−1 for any positive integer n,
then the sequence {f (xn)}+∞n=1 is monotonically increasing
and finally converges to a stationary point of the original
problem. In general, g (x;xn−1) is chosen to have a simpler
form than f(x), which makes the iterations efficient. For more
details about the MM method, please refer to [31], [32] and
references therein.
B. Brief introduction to ADMM algorithm
The ADMM algorithm is used to deal with convex problems
of the following form,
min
x∈X ;z∈Z
f (x) + g (z) , s.t. Gx = z, (45)
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where f (x) and g (z) are convex functions and X and Z
are non-empty convex sets. The ADMM solves the above
optimization problem by iterating the following updates,
x(n) = argmin
x∈X


f (x) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥Gx − z(n−1)∥∥∥2
+ ℜ
{〈
y(n−1),Gx − z(n−1)
〉}

 ,
z(n) = argmin
z∈Z


g (z) +
ρ
2
∥∥∥Gx(n) − z∥∥∥2
+ ℜ
{〈
y(n−1),Gx(n) − z
〉}

 ,
y(n) = y(n−1) + ρ
(
Gx(n) − z(n)
)
,
where ρ is any positive real number and {x(n), z(n), y(n)}
denotes the solution in the nth iteration. According to [34,
Proposition 4.2], if the optimal solution set of the original
problem (45) is not empty and the matrix GHG is invertible,
then x(+∞) is an optimal solution of (45). For more details
about the ADMM alogrithm, please refer to [33]–[36] and
references therein.
C. The proof of Proposition 1
Similar proofs for the optimality of SDR-based methods can
be found in, e.g., [43]–[45] and references therein. Therefore,
we only show a sketch of the proof for the problem at hand.
The KKT conditions for (44) are as follows
Θ − diag {ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕK} − ϑT + ωT +Z = 0, (46a)∑K
i=1
ϕiPi + ϑ̟
2 + ω̺ = 0, (46b)
ZX =XZ = 0, Z  0, X  0, (46c)
ϑ ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · ·,K, (46d)
where {ϕi}Ki=1, ϑ, ω, and Z are the dual variables for
constraints (43b), (43c), (43d), and the constraint X  0,
respectively. From (46a)-(46c), we obtain Z =
∑K
i=1 ϕiDi +
ϑT +
∑K
i=1 ϕiPi+ϑ̟
2
̺ T −Θ  0. According to random matrix
theory, T = AHA is a full rank matrix with probability 1
when K ≤ N . Therefore, rank (Z) ≥ K − 1 with probability
1 since rank (Θ) = 1. Due to the fact that ZX = XZ = 0,
we obtain that rank (X ) ≤ 1. Therefore, for non-zero X , we
have rank (X ) = 1.
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